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Abstract 
 
Over the past two decades, the notion of the Cold War as a bipolar conflict has come under 
increasing strain, and several authors have pointed to aspects of Cold War reality that 
eschew the logic of binary distinctions and categories. While these points are well taken, we 
should be weary of dismissing Cold War binaries as mere myth. Instead, this paper argues 
for the need to take these binary distinctions and categories seriously as an object of 
analysis, treat them as elements of ‘practical knowledge’ (Bourdieu), and acknowledge their 
constitutive role in negotiating the relationships between ideological projects and everyday 
realities. Such and approach is particularly valuable when dealing with categories and 
normative distinctions that continue to circulate in journalistic and scholarly discourse today 
– including East/West, socialism /capitalism, elite/mass etc. – and that have in the meantime 
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accrued new meanings and functions. To demonstrate this, the paper examines the 
journalistic discourse about culture in the north-western part of Yugoslavia. Focusing on two 
distinct periods – the late 1940s and the early 1970s – it shows how the journalistic discourse 
about culture was used to position Yugoslav culture both geopolitically and historically, 
construct its internal hierarchies, as well as negotiate those elements of the local reality that 
were at odds with official identity narratives.  
 
Keywords: Cold War, culture, discourse, Yugoslavia, Italy 
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Since the Berlin Wall came down in 1989 our understanding of Cold War history has 
changed considerably. The new wave of research, spurred by the opening of archives and 
opportunities for novel East-West comparisons, threw into sharper relief aspects of the Cold 
War contest that had previously received little attention. It was becoming increasingly clear 
that the Cold War was not only a military, political and economic conflict, but one that was 
profoundly implicated in, and shaped by, key transformations in twentieth century culture.2 
Capitalizing on the increased accessibility of primary sources from former socialist states, 
recent research also provided valuable insights into the politics of everyday culture on both 
sides of the Iron Curtain,3 and we have also seen the publication of several transnational 
accounts of the cultural Cold War spanning both the West and the East.4  
 
This growing body of work has raised a number of wider conceptual and methodological 
issues. It questioned the value of understanding the socialist period as a ‘deviation’ from the 
supposedly normal course of historical development, and highlighted the continuities 
between post-1945 cultural histories and long-term historical trends, including the rise of 
modernity, popular sovereignty and mass culture. This literature also brought to light some of 
the structural similarities between the developments in the East and the West, and thereby 
questioned the value of understanding the Cold War as a bipolar divide, as well as the 
usefulness of thinking about socialism and capitalism in binary terms. In line with this, 
                                                 
2 E.g. Stephen J. Whitfield, The Culture of the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991); 
Frances Stonor Saunders, Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War (London: Granta, 1999); 
and Walter L. Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture and the Cold War, 1945-1961 (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1996); Shiela Fitzpatrick, The Cultural Front: Power and Culture in Revolutionary Russia 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); Stephen Kotkin, Magic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization (Berkely: 
University of California Press, 1997). 
3 E.g. Susan E. Reid and David Crowley, eds., Style and Socialism: Modernity and Material Culture in Post-
War Eastern Europe (Oxford and New York: Berg, 2000); David Lloyd Hoffmann, Stalinist Values: The 
Cultural Norms of Soviet Modernity, 1917-41 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003). 
4 E.g. Susan Buck-Morss, Dreamworld and Catastrophe. The Passing of Mass Utopia in the East and West 
(Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 2000); David Caute, The Dancer Defects: The Struggle for Cultural 
Supremacy during the Cold War (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); Uta G. Poiger, Jazz, 
Rock, and Rebels: Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany (Berkeley, Los Angeles and 
London: University of California Press, 2000). 
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several recent studies have argued for the importance of unpacking the logic of Cold War 
discourse, its historical roots and epistemic effects, as well as its continuing hold on scholarly 
and journalistic imagination. According to Alexei Yurchak, the binary categories that remain 
widespread in much of academic and journalistic writing about Soviet socialism – such as the 
state and the people, oppression and resistance, official and unofficial culture – cannot 
capture the complexity of values, ideals and realities of the Soviet system, within which 
‘control, coercion, alienation, fear, and moral quandaries were irreducibly mixed with ideals, 
communal ethics, dignity, creativity, and care for the future’.5 Dominic Boyer’s examination 
of dialectical knowledge in and its multiple figurations at work in twentieth-century German 
culture employs a compatible analytical approach, drawing attention to the constitutive role 
of dialectical thinking and knowing in shaping German modern culture.6 Among other things, 
Boyer traces the reshaping of the East/West distinction in the two Germanys, arguing that 
actors on each side of the Cold War divide drew on the East-West binary to displace the 
moral burden of Nazism onto the ‘other’ Germany, and then examines the strategic uses of 
the same distinction – now laden with new meanings – among media practitioners in post-
unification Germany.7   
 
Post-World War II Yugoslavia provides an apposite case study for a further reflection on the 
trajectories and politics of Cold War discourse and its role in shaping both the culture of the 
period as well as our ways of knowing it. The developments that followed Yugoslavia’s 
expulsion from Cominform in 1948 sit uneasily with the implicit East-West divide that 
underpins much of the Cold War historiography. Its ‘market socialism’ is often seen as a 
compromise between socialist planning and free enterprise, and its involvement in the Non-
                                                 
5 Alexei Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, until it Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 10. 
6 Dominic Boyer, Spirit and System: Media, Intellectuals, and the Dialectic of Modern German Culture 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
7 Ibid., pp. 181-270.  
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Aligned Movement can be interpreted as an articulation of the same compromise in the field 
of foreign policy.8 The same is true of Yugoslav culture: while initially adopting Soviet 
cultural policies,9 Yugoslavia’s writers, artists and other cultural producers soon started 
carving out a ‘third way’ between what they saw as the excessively state-controlled model of 
cultural production followed in the East, and the overly market-led approach favored in the 
West.10 It is tempting to describe these developments in terms of an encounter or struggle 
between the ‘Soviet’, ‘totalitarian’ or ‘Eastern’ model and the ‘capitalist’, ‘liberal’ or 
‘Western’ model of social organization. Indeed, such an approach is evident in the vast 
majority of existing literature on the cultural history of socialist Yugoslavia. Aleš Gabrič, 
whose work focuses on the changing cultural policies in Slovenia in the period between 1953 
and 1963, discusses these changes in terms of a gradual movement away from the ‘Soviet’ or 
‘Stalinist’ model of social organization, associated with direct party control over cultural 
production, towards a distinctly Yugoslav type of socialism, characterized by less rigid forms 
of party influence and a greater tolerance of diverse cultural forms and values.11 Predrag 
Marković, whose research spans from 1948 to 1965 and focuses on the Yugoslav capital of 
Belgrade, rejects the notion of an authentic, autochthonous Yugoslav road as a myth, and 
prefers to describe Yugoslav culture as a ‘field of struggle’ between Eastern and Western 
cultural influences.12 Reana Senjković, whose study analyses selected aspects of popular 
                                                 
8 E.g. Denison Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, 1948-1974 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); 
Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970). 
9 Ljubodrag Dimić, Agitprop kultura: Agitpropovska faza kulturne politike u Srbiji 1945-1952. godine (Beograd: 
Rad, 1988); Aleš Gabrič, Slovenska agitpropovska kulturna politika: 1945-1952 (Ljubljana: Mladika, 1991); 
Carol S. Lilly, Power and Persuasion: Ideology and Rhetoric in Communist Yugoslavia, 1944-1953 (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 2001), 1-160. 
10 Studies that trace various aspects of this transformation include Petar Luković, Bolja prošlost. Prizori iz 
muzičkog života Jugoslavije 1940-1989 (Beograd: Mladost, 1989); Aleš Gabrič, Socialistična kulturna 
revolucija: Slovenska kulturne politika, 1953-1962 (Ljubljana: Cankarjeva založba, 1995); Predrag J. Marković, 
Beograd između istoka i zapada 1948-1965. godine (Beograd: Službeni list SRJ, 1996); Igor Duda, U potrazi za 
blagostanjem: o povjesti dokolice i potrošačkog društva u Hrvatskoj 1959-ih i 1960-ih (Zagreb: Srednja Europa, 
2005); Reana Senjković, Izgubljeno u prijenosu: Pop iskustvo soc culture (Zagreb: Biblioteka nova etnografija, 
2008); Andrew Baruch Wachtel, Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation: Literature and Cultural Politics in 
Yugoslavia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998). 
11 Gabrič, Socialistična kulturna revolucija. 
12 Marković, Beograd između istoka i zapada , pp. 493-512.  
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culture from socialist Croatia, offers a slightly different account. In her view Yugoslav 
popular culture was ideologically ‘hybrid’, marked by a ‘cohabitation of at least two 
ideological models’.13 Another way of organizing the narrative about socialist Yugoslav 
culture is one that focuses on the shifting balance of nationalist antagonisms and Yugoslav 
unity, or ‘brotherhood’ and ‘unity’. This kind of approach is particularly prominent in 
Andrew Wachtel’s analysis of Yugoslav literature and cultural politics that stretches from the 
nineteenth century to the late twentieth century,14 but is apparent also in other works, 
especially those examining the characteristics of Yugoslav culture from the 1960s onward. 
 
Such accounts are clearly compelling and provide a much needed corrective to the usual, 
binary accounts of Cold War culture. Yet these contributions stop short of an explicit 
investigation of Yugoslav Cold War discourse as such, and its constitutive role in negotiating 
the relationships between the ideological project of socialist Yugoslavism and the reality of 
cultural practices and values at the time. In contrast, this paper takes the discourse of 
Yugoslav socialism as its central object of analysis. Following Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of 
practice, this discourse is understood as ‘practical knowledge’, produced by social actors who 
themselves constitute objects of analysis.15 This practical knowledge, organized around 
mundane, taken-for-granted categories and distinctions, was constituted by, as well as 
constitutive of, the reality of Yugoslav socialist culture, and should be subjected to critical 
scrutiny. What were the central normative assumptions, categories and distinctions at work in 
the practical knowledge about socialist Yugoslav culture? How did the social actors use this 
practical knowledge to make sense of the reality of cultural practices in the country? And 
                                                 
13 Senjković, Izgubljeno u prijenosu , p. 174. 
14 Wachtel, Making a Nation. 
15 Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, translated by Richard Nice 
(London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1984), pp. 467ff. 
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finally, what aspects of social reality did this discourse obscure, and in what ways did it help 
shore up or challenge the official identity narratives at the time?  
 
To answer these questions, this paper examines the journalistic discourse about culture in the 
north-western part of Yugoslavia, which encompasses the eastern side of the upper Adriatic 
coast and the region bordering Italy. There are several reasons that make this part of 
Yugoslavia particularly well suited for an investigation into the functioning of Cold War 
framings of culture. The proximity of Italy, the bilingualism of the local population, and the 
presence of ethnic minorities on both sides – Italians in Yugoslavia and Slovenians in Italy – 
encouraged constant cross-border exchanges and obstructed the processes of cultural 
homogenization and nation-building on each side of the border. Italian radio and later 
television were immensely popular with the local Yugoslav audiences, and from the 1960s 
onwards, shopping trips to Italy became a regular feature of everyday life.16 At the same time, 
many Italians and Slovenian minority members living in Italy became regular customers of 
Yugoslav restaurants and petrol stations, followed the radio and television broadcasts from 
Yugoslavia, and also formed a substantial proportion of foreign tourists visiting the Yugoslav 
coastal resorts. Due to these multiple cross-border ties, the region served both as a meeting 
point and as a battleground for competing conceptions of culture, identity and everyday life, 
promoted by cultural producers on both sides of the border.  
 
Cold War Culture in the North-western Yugoslavia 
 
To understand the full scope of these exchanges and tensions we need to keep in mind that 
this region forms part of the symbolic fracture that cuts the European continent, in the eyes of 
                                                 
16 Alenka Švab, ‘Consuming Western image of well-being: Shopping tourism in socialist Slovenia’, Cultural 
Studies, Vol. 16, No. 1, 63-79 (2002); Breda Luthar, ‘Remembering socialism: On desire, consumption and 
surveillance’, Journal of Consumer Culture, Vol. 6, No. 2, 229-259 (2006). 
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Western Europeans, into its civilized Western and underdeveloped Eastern or Balkan part. 
First formed in the period of Venetian Enlightenment,17 this symbolic fracture was 
subsequently remolded to suit the legitimating strategies and identity narratives promoted by 
the successive administrations in the region, including the Habsburg Empire, the Kingdom of 
Italy and Nazi Germany. After World War II, the older mental mappings became enmeshed 
with Cold War binaries, and were selectively appropriated to suit new political agendas, this 
time shaped by the global contest between the Soviet Union and the United States.18 Since the 
spreading of nationalism in the mid-nineteenth century, the successive changes of 
administration in the region were also accompanied by more or less violent forms of cultural 
homogenisation. The rise of fascism in Italy gave way to increasingly ruthless forms of 
Italianization of Slovenians and Croatians in the region, which in turn prompted a hardening 
of anti-Italian sentiments and gave rise to clandestine antifascist organizations that regularly 
resorted to violent means.19 Though paralleled by forms of Italo-Slav antifascist 
collaboration, this spiral of violence and suspicion continued throughout World War II and 
into the post-war period, and fostered the successive waves of (mostly Italian) emigration 
from the region. This history of shifting borders and ideological landscapes, intertwined with 
violence, prejudice and involuntary migration, gave rise to divided memories and identities 
that continue to shape individual recollections and collective memories in the northeastern 
Adriatic to this day.20 As we will see, they also had an impact on the appropriations of Cold 
War discourse in the region.  
 
                                                 
17 Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1994). 
18 Sabina Mihelj, ‘Drawing the East-West border: Narratives of modernity and identity in the north-eastern 
Adriatic (1947-54)’, in Thomas Lindenberger, Marcus M. Payk, Bernd Stoever and Annette Vowinckel, eds., 
European Cold War Cultures: Perspectives on Societies in the East and West (Oxford: Berghahn Books, in 
press). 
19 Marina Cattaruzza, L’Italia e il confline orientale (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2007), pp. 168-81. 
20 Pamela Ballinger, History in Exile: Memory and Identity at the Borders of the Balkans (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2002), 
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The paper demonstrates this by examining two distinct historical periods. The first part 
focuses on the immediate post-World War II period up to 1948, when Yugoslav cultural 
policies and practices were organized in much the same way as their equivalents in the Soviet 
Union and elsewhere in socialist Eastern Europe. The second part first reviews some of the 
key changes in Yugoslav cultural policies and practices over the course of the 1950s and the 
1960s, and then examines the discourse about culture in 1971, a point when the cultural field 
was marked by a high level of ideological diversification and by a rising tide of nationalist 
antagonisms. 
 
The Journalistic Discourse about Culture  
 
As evident from the discussion so far, this paper is concerned primarily with public discourse 
about culture rather than the cultural events, products or policies on themselves. In particular, 
it examines the normative understanding of culture promoted by the media, the distinctions 
and categories it relies upon, and analyzes the ways in which the press engaged with different 
cultural forms, including serialized novels, popular music and television series. The analysis 
also pays attention to the different uses of the key discursive distinctions and categories, 
focusing on their application in the negotiation of Yugoslav identity and culture. To asses the 
epistemic effects of these discursive strategies, the paper interprets them in relation to 
selected secondary literature about Cold War cultural practices and forms, both in Yugoslavia 
and beyond. The media covered in the analysis include all the major Croatian and Slovenian 
newspapers published in the north-western part of the federation (Riječki list/ Novi list, Glas 
Istre, Primorske novice), the pro-Yugoslav Slovenian minority newspaper issued in Trieste 
(Primorski Dnevnik), and one Italian minority newspaper (La Voce del Popolo).  
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It is important to clarify the limitations imposed by the nature of primary sources used. 
Especially in the early post-war years, the press largely reflected official views and did not 
exert an independent influence on cultural processes.21 This was also a period when the 
literacy rates were relatively low and local resistance to communist policies fairly 
widespread.22 Therefore, it may well be that the framing of culture promoted by the press was 
largely ignored by the wider population. Accepting this proposition, however, would mean 
confusing influence with approval; while the socialist Yugoslav press certainly cannot be 
taken as an accurate expression of public culture as a whole, it nevertheless played a major 
role in delineating the boundaries of what was publicly acceptable, and imposing ‘a structure 
of thinking’ even among those who did not support the regime.23 Finally, taking into account 
the role of the media becomes even more important when examining the developments after 
Tito’s split with Stalin in 1948 and in particular after the changes to cultural policies initiated 
in the early 1950s. In this period, the relative balance of power between the Party, the state, 
the market and the media shifted towards the latter, and the media became much more active 
players in the shaping of Yugoslav culture.  
 
Uplifting the working masses 
 
Throughout the first period examined in the paper, the border between Italy and Yugoslavia 
remained in flux. As the Cold War rivalry began to take shape, the territorial dispute between 
the two neighboring states assumed a strategically important geopolitical role, and became a 
                                                 
21 Gertrude Joch Robinson, Tito’s Maverick Media: the Politics of Mass Communications in Yugoslavia 
(Urbana, Chicago and London: University of Illinois Press, 1977), pp. 16-25; Lilly, Power and Persuasion, pp. 
43-45. 
22 The analyzed newspapers, particularly those aimed at the rural population, often emphasized the need to 
increase the literacy rates in the region, and criticized cultural events and trends that did not conform to official 
guidelines.  
23 Cf. Jeffrey Brooks, Thank You, Comrade Stalin! Soviet Public Culture from Revolution to Cold War 
(Princeton: Princeton university Press, 2000), p. xiv. 
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burning issue not only for Italy and Yugoslavia, but also for the Allied forces that took over 
the task of finding a solution to the ‘Trieste problem’.24 Following the signing of the Paris 
Peace Treaty in 1947, an interim solution was implemented, which included the 
establishment of the Free Territory of Trieste, an unusual political formation comprising 
Trieste and its immediate surroundings. The legitimacy of this solution remained disputed, 
and much of the local population, in particular in Trieste, continued to live in a state of 
perpetual mass mobilization, which prompted many to emigrate to Italy and other countries.25  
 
Operating in this volatile context, marked by the intensification of the global confrontation 
between the United States and the Soviet Union, the press was involved in a constant 
ideological battle. Along with the rest of the Yugoslav media, it formed part of a complex 
apparatus for cultural change, modeled on the one established in the Soviet Union and aimed 
at fostering the rise of a new, socialist Yugoslav culture.26 Although the Yugoslav press was 
legally free, and mostly not under direct ownership of the Communist Part of Yugoslavia 
(CPY) this apparatus nevertheless provided ample opportunities for the CPY to filter 
undesirable content and use the press as a collective agitator and propagandist. To start with, 
most major newspapers were founded by the Peoples’ Front of Yugoslavia, a mass 
organization that shared CPY’s ideological convictions.27 The Departments of Agitprop and 
Propaganda were regularly sending out detailed instructions on the most desirable cultural 
content, supplied newspapers with ready-made articles, and gave recommendations about 
editorial board membership.28 The CPY also used its influence over the legislative, judicial 
                                                 
24 Glenda Sluga, The Problem of Trieste and the Italo-Yugoslav Border: Difference, Identity, and Sovereignty in 
Twentieth-Century Europe (Albany: State University of New York Press), pp. 133-155. 
25 For a detailed account of the key events, including mass demonstrations, see Bogdan C. Novak, Trieste, 1941-
1954: The Ethnic, Political and Ideological Struggle (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970). 
26 Lilly, Power and Persuasion, pp. 35-54; as well as Dimić, Agitprop kultura, and Gabrič, Slovenska 
agitpropovska kulturna politika. 
27 Božidar Novak, Hrvatsko novinarstvo u 20. stoljeću (Zagreb: Golden Marketing – Tehnička knjiga, 2005), p. 
460. 
28 Lilly, Power and Persuasion, pp. 39-41. 
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and executive bodies to pass and enforce legislation favorable to the Communist Party, which 
allowed for various indirect forms of censorship, including issuing publishing permits only to 
loyal publishers, boosting the circulation of party-sponsored newspapers by allocating press 
subsidies, and preventing the spreading of un-orthodox views by limiting the use of paper or 
denying access to printing facilities.29  
 
Ideologically, the normative views about Yugoslav culture promoted by the CPY in this 
period were rooted in Marxist-Leninist perceptions of modernity and society, centered on the 
notion of culture as a tool of progress and elevation of the working classes familiar from the 
Soviet system of values as established in the post-revolutionary period. At the same time, 
these programmatic ideas were also marked by the experience of bloody intra-Yugoslav 
nationalist conflicts during the war and memories of inter-war Yugoslavism. Inter-war 
Yugoslav elites were initially intent on building a synthetic Yugoslav culture, rooted in the 
belief that Yugoslav peoples constituted a single national whole.30 This understanding of 
Yugoslavism came to be perceived by many non-Serbs as an attempt to Serbianize the 
country, and despite the gradual movement away from ideas of ‘integral Yugoslavism’ in the 
1930s, inter-war Yugoslavia was subsequently remembered as an oppressive state intent on 
forcibly assimilating Yugoslav peoples into a single nation.31 Such selective memory 
constituted one of the premises that enabled the post-war Yugoslav elites to construct their 
project of Yugoslav nation-building as an entirely unprecedented endeavor to tie the South 
Slavs to a single political roof while at the same time maintaining their national 
distinctiveness. This twin emphasis on ideological unity and national distinctiveness – 
embodied in the slogan ‘brotherhood and unity’ – formed the basis of the communist 
                                                 
29 Robinson, Tito’s Maverick Media, pp. 16-25; Lilly, Power and Persuasion, pp. 43-45. 
30 Wachtel, Making a Nation, pp. 67-127. 
31 Dejan Djokić, Elusive Compromise: A History of Interwar Yugoslavia (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2007), pp. 171-222. 
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Yugoslav nation-building project, and purportedly helped guard the new Yugoslavia against 
the ‘mistake’ committed by its interwar predecessor.32  
 
The other key element of the post-war Yugoslav ideology was the attempt at marrying the 
national liberation struggle to working class struggle. According to the Yugoslav myth of 
origins, this union was forged during the Second World War, and found its expression in the 
Anti-Fascist Yugoslav People’s Liberation Struggle, led by the Yugoslav Partisans.33 In line 
with this myth, the past anti-imperial struggles of South Slavs were now reinterpreted as 
struggles that were led not only by oppressed nations fighting anti-national regimes, but also 
by exploited working classes revolting against the bourgeoisie. Interwar Yugoslavia, went the 
argument, was unable to resolve intra-Yugoslav nationalist conflicts, and instead exacerbated 
them, largely due to continuing nationalist antagonisms between different national 
bourgeoisies and capitalist exploitation.34 As we will see, this blend of nationalist and 
communist goals proved difficult to sustain, not least because it introduced a powerful 
element of continuity that presented a challenge to the discursive and political attempts to 
create a ‘new’ Yugoslav culture. After all, Yugoslav socialist cultural policies continued to be 
underpinned by the key tropes and categories used in the pre-1945 decades, including terms 
like kultura or cultura (Croatian/Slovenian for culture) and narod, popolo and ljudstvo 
(Croatian, Italian and Slovenian for people/nation) that were burdened with the ideological 
baggage of nineteenth-century nation-building projects.35 The words narod, popolo and 
ljudstvo were particularly crucial in this respect, since they could be used to refer both to an 
ethnonational community as well as an ethnically diverse collective. As such, they could 
                                                 
32 Dejan Jović, ‘Communist Yugoslavia and Its ‘Others’,’ in Ideologies and National Identities: The Case of 
Twentieth century Southeastern Europe, edited by John Lampe and Mark Mazower (Budapest: CEU Press, 
2004), pp. 282-285. 
33 Wachtel, Making a Nation, p. 133. 
34 Esad Zgodić, Titova nacionalna politika: temeljni pojmovi, načela i vrijednosti (Sarajevo: Kantonalni odbor 
SDP BiH, 2000), pp. 40-42. 
35 Wachtel, Making a Nation, pp. 6ff. 
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simultaneously convey both national and class belonging (as for instance in the formulation 
‘working people’) while discursively resolving possible tensions between them.  
 
This particular blend of nationalist and communist ideas provided the broader context within 
which the normative views about the ‘new’ Yugoslav culture in the north-west of the 
federation were shaped. Three features of these normative framing were particularly 
prominent in the analyzed newspaper coverage: (a) the understanding of culture as a tool of 
progress and education; (b) the distinction between form and substance, coupled with an 
emphasis on the importance of the latter; (c) the mass character of culture. On every account, 
the ‘new Yugoslav culture’ was construed as the exact opposite of ‘bourgeois’ culture of the 
pre-war past, which allegedly also continued to flourish in the West and in the neighboring 
Italy.  
 
a. Culture as an instrument of progress and education. To start with, culture was seen 
primarily as an instrument of progress and education rather than entertainment or leisure, and 
was to be aimed at the working classes. This understanding of culture came very clearly to 
the fore in articles aimed at mobilizing the local population for extended bouts of 
concentrated production known as ‘shockwork’ and for competitions between local factories 
and other organizations that were expected to boost productivity.36 Articles dedicated to 
shockwork and competition, typically written by local CPY leaders or left unsigned, were a 
common sight in the newspapers, and often appeared on the first few pages. As one such 
article explained, cultural activities formed an integral part of the process of ‘ideological 
elevation’, which would also help speed up the industrialization of the country and help 
construct a ‘new Yugoslavia’. The article expressed concern at the lack of attention paid by 
                                                 
36 Lilly, Power and Persuasion, pp.118-20. 
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the local labor union organization to the cultural aspects of the competition, and called for 
more effort to be invested in organizing literacy classes and simulating entry into education.37 
In a similar vein, another article criticized the cultural activities accompanied the 
competitions organized by the labor unions for putting too much emphasis on entertainment. 
staging too many ‘light’ plays, and supplying local libraries with sentimental novels instead 
of promoting culture that would help recruit volunteers for shockwork and the youth labor 
brigades. Both leisure and entertainment were considered legitimate and necessary, yet the 
key task of Yugoslav cultural manifestations lay elsewhere:  
 
they should inculcate seriousness of life needed for the construction 
of the new state, they should teach the people/nation [popolo] to take 
pride in work, to take pride in bringing one’s own contribution to the 
creation of a common future’.38  
 
A report intent on exposing the drawbacks of cultural and educational activities in the region 
was even more prescriptive, arguing that far too little effort was invested into cultural 
activities that would support the Yugoslav economy, and that more should be done to set up 
cultural events aimed at promoting participation in agricultural and other activities laid out in 
the five year plan.39 The emphasis on the role of culture as a tool of socialist mobilization and 
progress also played a key role in the selection of various fictional and semi-fictional cultural 
forms published in the same newspapers. For instance, the protagonists of short stories, 
serialized novels and comic dialogues were most often model socialist workers or peasants, 
involved in a revolutionary battle or in heroic re-building of their war-torn society. One such 
                                                 
37 ‘L’elevazione culturale ideologica’, La Voce del Popolo, 15 January 1947, p. 1. 
38 N., ‘Più contenuto nei programmi artistici’, La Voce del Popolo, 03 Jan 1947, p. 3. 
39 Štefica Kopitar: ‘O nekim nedostacima u postavljanju kulturno-prosvetnog rada’, Glas Istre, 03 October 1947, 
p. 10. 
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serialized novel was set in the context of the October Revolution,40 while another featured 
Istrian peasants reminiscing about their resistance activities during World War II, and 
proudly talking about the freedom brought to them by the new Yugoslav rule.41 
 
Apart from supporting specifically socialist and Yugoslav goals, cultural activities were also 
meant to contribute to the general cultural and civilisational ‘elevation’ of the Yugoslav 
population by developing its cultural awareness and sensibility, inculcating the habit of 
participating in cultural activities, and teaching them to appreciate and understand art. In an 
article summarizing the plan of work of the theatre in Rijeka, workers were for instance 
encouraged to ‘treat theatre as their home’, since this would purportedly ‘help in their general 
and cultural elevation and raise the level of artistic education of the whole nation/people 
[narod]’.42 In a similar vein, investment into the renovation of local cultural infrastructure 
was presented as evidence of the government’s concern for ‘the raising of the cultural level of 
the nation/people [narod]’.43 The treatment of illiteracy provides another case in point. In one 
article, written by the republican-level Committee for the Spreading of Literacy and most 
likely supplied by the Agitprop, illiteracy was presented as a major marker of cultural and 
civilisational underdevelopment, ‘suffocating the free labor force and enthusiasm for work 
among our people’ and hindering the progress of villages as well as the realization of the five 
year plan. In line with this, a report from a literacy course organized in an Istrian town 
insisted that illiteracy should be erased from Tito’s Yugoslavia, ‘since it is only in this way 
that we will be able to build the country and make it cultured and progressive’.44 Or, as one 
Yugoslav citizen explained in a letter he wrote as part of his literacy training: ‘The war is 
                                                 
40 Kononov, ‘Djevojka sa severa’, Glas Istre, 07 November 1947, p. 6. 
41 Zora Pamić, ‘Prve brazde’, Riječki list, 03 March 1947, p. 3. 
42 J.K., ‘Plan rada narodnog kazališta u novoj sezoni’, Riječki list, 05 September 1947, p. 3. 
43 Photo-news article without title, Glas Istre, 03 October 1947, p. 10. 
44 Zemaljski odbor za širenje pismenosti: ‘Svi u borbu protiv nepismenosti!’, Glas Istre, 03 October 1947, p. 10. 
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over, but we need to continue with our struggle against illiteracy’.45 Literacy, in other words, 
was believed to constitute the very basis of Yugoslavia’s cultural progress.  
 
The notion of culture as a marker of progress served as a discursive tool for establishing a 
range of hierarchical distinctions within the local population, singling out those that were 
most in need of ‘cultural elevation’. The caption accompanying the aforementioned letter, 
written by a model Yugoslav citizen who had just attended a literacy class, described the 
author of the letter as coming ‘from the village’, and addressing his letter at his ‘comrades’ at 
the local factory. These seemingly neutral categories, which pervaded the newspaper pages at 
the time, clearly indicate the hierarchical relationship between the literate ‘comrades’ and the 
hitherto illiterate ‘peasant’ who is now finally ready to catch up with the process of elevation 
an progress. The other two groups often singled as targets of the socialist civilizing project 
were ‘women’ and ‘the youth’. For instance, the already discussed report from a literacy 
course explicitly emphasized that all the attendees were women, commended them for their 
effort, and argued that the newly acquired knowledge will enable them ‘to raise their children 
as true mothers of our new society – our homeland’, thus leaving no doubt as to what the 
primary tasks of women in the new Yugoslavia should be. 46   
 
The understanding of culture as a means of development was also used to delineate between 
the ‘new’ Yugoslav culture of the future and the ‘old’ culture of the pre-World War II 
decades. Yet in contrast to the mainstream Yugoslav discourse sketched earlier, the cultural 
other was not King Alexander’s Yugoslavia but Italy. Aforementioned articles promoting 
‘cultural elevation’ routinely referred to the neighboring country and the Fascist rule in 
particular as the party responsible for the cultural ‘backwardness’ of the local population. An 
                                                 
45 The letter was reproduced in Glas Istre, 07 March 1947, p. 5. 
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article reporting on a cultural youth festival in Buje contrasted the flourishing cultural life of 
the village in the new Yugoslavia with the cultural wasteland of pre-war decades, when ‘the 
nation/people were left without its own language, without books and education and without 
opportunities for cultural development’.47 The same message was repeated in a report 
summarizing the achievements of the new administration in one of the localities in Istria, 
written by a prominent Slovenian member of the local Communist Party Julij Beltram:   
 
It was not easy to take over the heritage of Fascist Italy, which was 
oppressing this people/nation [ljudstvo], and Croatian and Slovenian 
people/nation [živelj] in particular, in the most shameful manner, de-
nationalising them and preventing any education of Slovenians and 
Croatians as well as the Italian working strata. It was not easy to take 
over and govern without personnel, since in some places as much as 
60% of the population was illiterate, all thanks to a state which is 
boasting a cultural tradition going back two thousand years.48 
 
This excerpt also provides a good example of the specific imbrications of communist and 
nationalist categories characteristic of local appropriations of Cold War discourse in this part 
of Yugoslavia, and is symptomatic of the challenges faced by Cold War discourse of culture 
in the local context. By referring to the ‘Italian working strata’ as one of the victims of 
Fascism, and mentioning them as part of the same nation/people [ljudstvo] together with 
‘Slovenians’ and ‘Croatians’, Beltram is trying to sustain the perception of the communist 
project as a transnational endeavor that defends the interests of the working classes. Yet at the 
same time, his choice of categories ‘Slovenians’ and ‘Croatians’ indicates that in the case of 
                                                 
47 T.D., ‘Omladinska smotra kulture u Bujama’, Glas Istre, 07 March 1947, p. 5. 
48 Julij Beltram, ‘Dosedanji rezultati dela ljudske oblasti v Koprščini in Bujščini’, Primorski dnevnik, 03 Sept 
1947, p. 1. 
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South Slavs, communist aims coincide with the interests of the nation as a whole. Although 
Beltram’s use of categories was not entirely at odds with the social composition of the local 
population – the urban, upper-class population residing in the region was indeed 
predominantly Italian, while the rural hinterland was overwhelmingly Slav – national and 
class distinctions did not coincide as neatly and were not as clear-cut as Beltram implied. 
Apart from neglecting the complexity of ideological, national and class identities in the 
region, such use of national and class based categories, similarly as other proclamations of 
Italo-Yugoslav brotherhood in local newspapers, also obscured the persistence of mutual 
suspicions and conflicts.49 Arguably, the repetitive occurrence of Fascism and Italy as the 
main others also helped sustain the perception of Italian culture as inherently fascist, and 
thereby fuelled anti-Italian prejudice in spite of official support for brotherhood.    
 
Another element of continuity can be found in the appropriation of older cultural forms, 
embedded in nineteenth-century projects of nation-building and education. A good case in 
point is provided by the comic dialogues between Franina and Jurina, appearing on the pages 
of the Croatian language newspaper Glas Istre. The protagonists of these dialogues were 
always the same: two Istrian peasants talking in the local dialect, known from the Croatian-
language almanacs that played an important role in Croatian nation-building in the region. 
One was somewhat more ignorant than the other, and provided a convenient target for mild 
ridicule as well as education. In each episode of the dialogue, the better-informed protagonist 
would talk to his friend about an important event or issue and criticize him for knowing so 
little about it. In all cases, the events and issues discussed were taken from the Party’s agenda 
for that week or day, and included for instance the five year plan and the Yugoslav state 
budget, the building of the new railway system, and the 30th anniversary of the October 
                                                 
49 Sabina Mihelj, ‘Imperial Myths between Nationalism and Communism: Appropriations of Imperial Legacies 
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Revolution.50 Although the dialogues were evidently adapted to suit the perception of culture 
as a tool of the communist modernizing project, they were at the same time helping solidify 
the perception of socialist Yugoslav nation-building as an extension of the pre-war Croatian 
nation-building. 
 
b. Substance over form. Another distinct feature of debates about Yugoslav culture in this 
period was a pronounced aversion to ‘formalism’ and a strong emphasis on the ideological 
‘content’ or ‘substance’ of art and culture. Yugoslav art critics were frequently warning 
against ‘purely formal beauty’, ‘art for art’s sake’ and ‘ideologically empty art’, presenting 
them as a remnants of the ‘old’, ‘bourgeois’ culture that had the function of distracting the 
masses from real social problems, as well as from rational explanations and solutions to these 
problems. A key distinction established in such debates was the distinction between 
substance and form: it was the latter, argued various authors, which should be treated as 
decisive when evaluating a work of art. A characteristic use of this distinction appears in a 
commentary published on the cover page of La Voce del Popolo, written by Eros Sequi, the 
first secretary of the Union of Italians and one of the ‘good Italians’ trusted by the Yugoslav 
regime due to his unequivocal support for socialist Yugoslavia.51 In his view, people should 
be prepared to compromise on the ‘external aspects’ of culture, and keep in mind that 
‘external beauty can only be established once one has assured a progressive substance’.52  
 
The distinction between substance and form was repeatedly drawn upon in articles about 
various cultural activities in the region. A report on the cultural youth festival organized in 
the Istrian town of Buje commended the participants for staging ‘good plays’, and as evident 
                                                 
50 ‘Franina i Jurina’, Glas Istre, 03 April 1947, p. 7, 07 March 1947, p. 7, and 07 November 1947, p. 7, 
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51 Ballinger, History in Exile, p. 213. 
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from the titles listed, a prime criterion was the inclusion of socialist ideas or motives from the 
Yugoslav partisan struggle during World War Two. One such play, entitled The Hotel of the 
Past, was praised for revealing ‘the deception, exploitation and inhospitality in hotels of the 
past’, and implicitly suggesting that the Yugoslav hotels of the future will be fairer to both 
their employees and guests.53 Following similar criteria, a review of cultural events organized 
by the local labor unions disappointedly commented on the ‘ideological emptiness’ of some 
of the events, and listed several theatre plays that would have allegedly better served the 
purpose of education and mobilization.54  
 
The contrast between ideological emptiness and progressive substance was also used to 
demarcate the ‘new’ Yugoslav culture in spatial, geo-cultural terms. The exemplary models 
of cultural products and activities that paid due attention to ‘substance’ were often found in 
the Soviet Union, while negative examples of ‘formalistic’ culture were associated with ‘the 
West’. In an article about Soviet culture translated from the Soviet daily Pravda, Western 
culture and civilization were described as ‘superficial’, hiding a ‘spiritual poverty of 
contemporary imperialists and their followers’. In contrast, Soviet culture allegedly ‘arose 
from and blossoms on the basis of a genuine democracy, brotherly friendship of equal 
nations’, and now ‘provides the rallying point for all the progressive forces of the world’.55 
Differences between Yugoslav and Italian culture were scrutinized through the same 
normative lens. The article written by Eros Sequi is very revealing in this respect. In his view, 
Italians, including those living in Yugoslavia, were particularly  prone to the ‘bourgeois’ and 
overly ‘formalistic’ treatment of art and culture, since their cultural capabilities were ‘most 
ruthlessly manipulated and made deviant by decades of Fascism’.56 This ‘deviant’ culture was 
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seen not only as an element of ‘the old society’ dominating in Italy, but also as ‘the secret 
weapon of imperialism’ operating from within the socialist Yugoslav state itself, and 
hampering its progress. In contrast, inhabitants of Slavic descent were considered to be 
‘much more open to re-education’, since their sensibilities have not been contaminated by 
fascist education.57 It was probably not a coincidence that such a condemnation of Italian 
culture came from the secretary of the Union of Italians. This helped avoid the charge of anti-
Italian prejudice, and solidified the difference between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Italians.  
 
c. Culture as a mass phenomenon. The third notable feature of the framing of culture in this 
period was the emphasis on its mass character. The new Yugoslav culture was expected to 
extend its appeal well beyond the educated elites and thereby contribute to the erasure of 
class boundaries. Yugoslavia was to be a country in which culture addressed the genuine 
needs of the ‘working people’, in which the qualitative distinction between elite and mass 
culture was abolished, and in which high-quality culture was produced and enjoyed at a mass 
scale. An article written by a Croatian language teacher who worked as an editor and 
journalist for various newspapers published in the region58 proudly announced that 
Yugoslavia was ‘a country of new culture, in which a book is not a good produced for the 
market, but […] an integral part of working people/nation’s [radnog naroda] life’.59 An 
article detailing the work plan of the theatre in Rijeka was marked by the same normative 
assumptions about the role of culture, emphasizing the theatre’s efforts to ‘massify the 
theatre’ and ‘turn the whole people/nation [narod] into a theatre audience’ by introducing 
season tickets for labor union members.60  
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Not all of the cultural products and activities at the time, however, were equally successful at 
attracting mass participation, and much of the reporting was dedicated to criticizing particular 
events and activities for failing to live up to the new cultural ideals. For example, an article 
evaluating the cultural-educational activities in the city of Rijeka and its surroundings 
criticized the organizers for their failure to establish strong ties with mass organizations and 
achieve greater popular appeal.61 Apart from that, mass appeal also played a key role in 
distinguishing it from Italian and more broadly ‘Western’ culture, as well as from the culture 
of Fascist Italy. While the articles acknowledged that Italian culture is highly developed, they 
were also pointing out that the ability to appreciate and enjoy it was limited to the wealthy, 
educated elites rather than being democratically available to its whole population, including 
the working classes. The aforementioned article discussing the work plan of the Rijeka 
theatre contrasted the strategies for massification adopted by the theatre with the situation 
under Italian rule, when the authorities ‘calculatedly diverted the working people from 
theatre, deliberately entertaining them with light comedies […] in order to distract them from 
political and social problems’.62 In contrast, the Soviet Union was presented as a shining 
example of the growing ‘massification’ (omasovljenje) of culture, exemplified in the 
mushrooming of cultural institutions and activities that made culture available to the masses. 
In an article translated from Pravda, depicting the cultural and educational achievements of 
the Soviet Union since the revolution, provided details about the number of new theatres and 
schools built and books issued since the revolution, and boasted about the rising educational 
level of the general population.63 A similar quantitative approach to measuring cultural 
development was employed when measuring the cultural progress of Yugoslavia. 
Occasionally, newspapers published lists with exact numbers of books issued, new magazines 
and newspapers established, or libraries built since the formation of the ‘new’ Yugoslavia.  
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On the whole, journalistic discourse about culture in 1947 clearly contributed to the 
discursive politics of Yugoslav socialist identity. The prevailing normative distinctions were 
used to assess the value of local cultural production and differentiate between more and less 
valuable examples of cultural events and activities, and more or less ‘developed’ segments of 
the population, as well as served to delineate the position of Yugoslav culture in both 
geopolitical and historical terms, contrasting it with the ‘old’ culture of the pre-revolutionary 
past, as well as with the culture of its contemporary others in the West. Local journalists also 
appropriated these normative ideals to suit the local power struggles and the associated, 
historically constituted categories and distinctions. In this sense, discourses about culture 
served to delineate the achievements of new Yugoslav culture in relation to the Fascist past, 
as well as in relation to contemporary Italian culture. Negotiating the relationship with the 
Italian minority and its culture proved particularly tricky, and reveals the challenges 
encountered by Yugoslav discourses about culture in the northwest of the federation. Caught 
between the ideals of trans-national brotherhood of the working classes on the one hand, and 
the need to construct a Fascist enemy on the other hand, journalistic discourses about culture 
did little to dispel mutual suspicions, despite declaratively promoting the ideals of Italo-
Yugoslav brotherhood. In practice, the break with the ‘old’ culture, inter-ethnic suspicions, 
and the sedimented forms of knowing and classifying identity and difference was far more 
difficult to achieve than journalistic discourse would have us believe.  
 
Apart from obscuring continuities with the past, the clear-cut distinctions drawn by media 
discourse about Yugoslav culture also neglected structural similarities in cultural practices 
and values on both sides of the Iron Curtain. There is of course no doubt that the notions of 
culture charted above have a lot in common with the Soviet system of cultural values, as 
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established in the post-revolutionary period,64 as well as with debates about culture elsewhere 
in the Eastern bloc in the post-1945 period.65 Yet while acknowledging that the ideas about 
the desirable content of culture in the East and West differed, we should also keep in mind 
that being able to provide culture for the masses was a goal pursued by intellectuals on both 
sides of Cold War divide.66 Modern means of mass communication were believed to provide 
particularly powerful instruments of cultural development and modernization. For many 
American social scientists and UNESCO officials at the time, the media were ‘great 
multipliers’, capable of increasing the amount of information people can send and receive, 
and thereby speeding up processes of change in even the most remote backwaters of the 
world.67 The habit of assessing development by means of quantitatively measuring the 
proliferation of mass culture was also not unique to the Eastern block. Literacy rates, 
newspaper circulation and radio receivers per capita were all indicators widely adopted in 
post-war American studies of modernization and development.68 Given the shared history of 
‘culture counting’ – a practice that became widespread across Europe by the mid-nineteenth 
century69 – this structural similarity is hardly surprising, and is one of the features that attest 
to the shared roots of the understanding of culture on both sides of the Cold War divide.  
 
Another shared feature, prominent especially in the early post-war years, was the disdain for 
genuinely popular cultural forms. Despite the constant promotion of culture and art inspired 
by the needs of ‘the working masses’, Yugoslav commentators were dismissive of cultural 
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forms actually enjoyed by the same ‘masses’. Jazz and modern dance, they argued, will instill 
idleness and promote worldly pleasures instead of mobilizing the population for the 
construction of socialism. Ironically, in a country that prided itself on being genuinely 
popular, owned and ruled by ‘the people’, popular cultural preferences did not seem to 
matter. In one article, jazz was described as ‘hysterical’,70 while another described ‘boogie-
woogie’ as a phenomenon that clearly ‘has nothing to do with culture’.71 These anxieties 
were shared by Soviet Party officials, who were constantly concerned about the vulnerability 
of the Russian people to various cultural seductions and deviations orchestrated by the 
capitalist world.72 Similarly as the inclination to associate the proliferation of mass culture 
with development and progress, such fears were far from being specific to the Eastern block. 
The popularity of American movies, music, and dances among young East and West 
Germans in the early 1950s provoked strikingly similar responses in both Germanies, causing 
anxiety over the oversexualization of women and feminization of men purportedly stimulated 
by these cultural forms.73 Feeding on pre-existing cultural fears of mass society, consumerism 
and modernity, such anxieties constituted another key thread shared by early Cold War 
cultural policies and discourses about culture in both the East and the West.  
 
By obscuring these fundamental similarities and continuities, the early Cold War discourse 
about Yugoslav culture in the region helped sustain the belief in the uniqueness and 
superiority of the socialist system vis-à-vis the political, economic and cultural structures of 
the past, as well as those implemented in the West, and thereby helped prevent systematic 
comparisons that could have challenged the legitimacy of the Yugoslav regime at the time.  
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Cultivating the nation and entertaining the masses  
 
After Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the Cominform in 1948, Yugoslav cultural policies and 
public discourses about culture started departing from the patterns we have observed in the 
previous section. This shift formed an integral part of more wide-ranging changes which 
eventually let to the rejection of ‘Soviet’ or ‘Stalinist’ models and gave rise to a new 
‘founding myth’ of socialist Yugoslavia, namely ‘worker’s self-management’.74 One of the 
key deficiencies of the Stalinist system, as identified by the CPY leadership, lied in the highly 
centralized Party-State apparatus, which obstructed the implementation of ‘direct social self-
management’.75 As stated in the 1952 Resolution and Statue adopted at the Sixth Congress of 
the CPY – renamed at that point into the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) – the 
Party should not act as ‘the direct operative manager and commander in economic, State, and 
social life’, but rather focus on the ‘political and ideological work in educating the masses’.76 
Changes taking place in the realm of cultural policies followed a similar logic. Already in 
1949, the CPY leadership came to the conclusion that the old cultural policies, aimed at 
changing popular consciousness with the help of ‘administrative means’, were misguided. 
Instead, they argued for a less intrusive and prescriptive approach to culture, and for greater 
ideological pluralism.77 
 
In the aftermath of these shifts within political leadership, new tropes entered the Yugoslav 
public discourse, organized around slogans such as ‘debureaucratization’, ‘decentralization’, 
and of course ‘workers’ self-management’.78 Journalistic attacks on ‘Western’ and ‘idealist’ 
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art were becoming less frequent, socialist realism was no longer hailed as the aesthetic deal,79 
and newspapers were increasingly filled with critical reports about repression in the Soviet 
Union, as well as with information drawn from Western sources.80 These shifting discourses 
crystallized around a new understanding of Yugoslav identity and culture, based on the idea 
of Yugoslavia as a meeting point of the East and the West, but belonging to neither. ‘We,’ 
argued Tito in a speech delivered in 1954, ‘are following our own path into socialism, and we 
will not allow anyone, neither those in the East nor those in the West, to make us stray away 
from this path’.81 Similar ideas were being voiced by some of the most prominent members of 
the Yugoslav cultural elites at the time, including Miroslav Krleža, who insisted on the 
uniqueness of Yugoslav culture, and its distinctiveness both in the relation to the East and to 
the West.82  This new geo-political identity provided the overarching cultural theme for a 
range of cultural policies aimed at creating an overarching Yugoslav culture until the early 
1960s,83 but was then overshadowed by the rise of particular national identities – an issue we 
return to later.  
 
Whether and to what extent Yugoslavia actually managed to fulfill the promises of its distinct 
road to socialism remains disputed. While the LCY did indeed gave up its monopoly over the 
political decision-making process, it retained control over the appointment of key personnel 
in the People’s Front – renamed in 1953 into the Socialist Alliance of the Working People 
(SAWP) – as well as in the trade unions, municipal governments and other organizations.84 In 
the realm of economic policy, the state retained a powerful role, and although the successive 
waves of economic reforms did indeed bring significant changes that helped increase the 
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general well-being of Yugoslav citizens, the Yugoslav system effectively remained socialist 
in nature, and self-management was never fully implemented in practice.85 Changes in the 
realm of culture were possibly more far-reaching. The Departments of Agitprop and 
Propaganda were formally abolished in 1952, and Yugoslavia’s cinemas, news stands, 
concert halls and bookshops opened their doors to cultural imports from the West. Between 
1945 and 1950, Yugoslavia imported a total of 240 films, of which 192 were produced in the 
Soviet Union. After 1950, the Yugoslav film market was dominated by film imports from the 
West, above all from the USA, but also from France, Italy and Britain.86 The early 1950s also 
saw the return of comics; in 1952, the daily newspaper Politika, sponsored by the SAWP, 
started publishing Donald Duck comics, and re-launched its popular weekly comic 
magazine.87 At the same time, official attitudes towards jazz and popular music softened as 
well, though a measure of suspicion remained.88 Nevertheless, periodic purges, closing down 
of journals and persecutions served as constant reminders that cultural experimentation has its 
limits. 
 
Influenced by broader changes in the realm of culture, politics and economy, the Yugoslav 
media system also started undergoing a significant transformation, although major changes 
took place only in the 1960. This was a period when liberal-minded party leaders were 
gaining ground across Yugoslavia, and were pushing for further market reforms modeled on 
the West and for greater intellectual and religious freedoms.89 The principles of self-
management were finally being translated into legislative changes that allowed the media to 
elect their top management, which increased their organizational independence and 
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contributed to the professionalization of media management.90 Yugoslav journalists achieved 
greater political independence as well, reformed their professional organization, and 
redefined its key aims by drawing on Karl Popper’s concept of the open society.91 At the 
same time, as a result of economic reforms, financial independence of publishing houses and 
broadcasting organizations increased as well: direct state funding decreased sharply, taxation 
levels were dropped, broadcasting organizations were allowed to set subscription fees based 
on service costs, and acquired control over 70% of their total profits. Advertising revenues 
began constituting an increasingly significant proportion of revenue, even in the broadcasting 
sector.92 The financial independence of publishing houses and broadcasting organizations 
increased as well, and so did the incentives to maximize profits, for instance by opening the 
pages of daily newspapers to entertainment and by publishing special interest weekly 
magazines dedicated to sports, fashion, television and film and the like. Circulation numbers 
from the period speak for themselves: while the total circulation of newspapers – in part 
affected also by the rising popularity of radio and television – decreased from 10.06 millions 
in 1964 to 8.67 in 1970, the total circulation of magazines increased from 3.8 million to 8.24 
million in the same period.93 
 
The 1960s were also marked by a strengthening of nationalist antagonisms in the federation. 
The combination of economic reforms and a more open climate allowed for the consolidation 
of key nation-building institutions, associated with the constituent Yugoslav nations. It did 
not take long for these developments to prompt a revival of nationalist antagonisms, regional 
economic rivalries, and mutual suspicions between national majorities and minorities.94 In the 
public realm, grievances were more and more often expressed in ethnic terms, a tendency 
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facilitated by the decentralization of the media system in this period.95 Subjected to 
republican rather than federal control, the separate republican media systems were 
increasingly functioning as proto-national media systems, aimed at first at the different 
national ‘imagined communities’,96 and only then at the wider Yugoslav community. Cultural 
policies aimed at creating an integrated Yugoslav culture were abandoned, heated exchanges 
over ‘unitarism’ were becoming more and more common, and were paralleled by the rising 
prominence of nationalist ideas in educational and linguistic policies, and increasing 
divergence of the history and literary curricula taught in each of the republics.97 Ultimately, 
the alliance between liberal reformers and nationalist leaders proved deadly for both. By the 
end of 1971, it was clear that federal authorities were gearing up for a thorough purge of both 
liberals and nationalists from all major political and cultural institutions, and by the end of 
1972, virtually all the leaders of liberal reforms that marked the late 1960s have disappeared 
from public light.  
 
These developments inevitably had an impact on the Yugoslav press examined in this paper, 
both in terms of its institutional arrangements as well as with regard to its form and content. 
Most newspapers have adopted a new (smaller) format, and introduced several new rubrics 
aimed primarily at attracting additional readers. Novi list (previously entitled Riječki list) and 
Glas Istre introduced an equivalent of the ‘Page Three Girl’ on their back pages, and 
Primorski Dnevnik took every opportunity to include a photo of a half-naked popular singer 
or actress, making the visual layout of these newspapers strikingly different from the one 
characteristic of the late 1940s (Figures 1 and 2). Advertising, virtually nonexistent in 1947, 
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was now a regular feature, and included half-page adverts for Coca-Cola and several adverts 
for various shops in the nearby Italian towns and cities.98  
 
[Figures 1 and 2 about here; suggested size and layout: about ¼ of page each, printed side 
by side.] 
Figure 1: Cover page of first issue of Rijećki list, 01 March 1947. 
Figure 2: Back page of Novi list, 01 April 1971. 
 
In parallel with these shifts, the understanding of culture was changing as well. The 
investigation is limited to the coverage published in 1971, a point when many of the key 
trends just discussed in relation to the 1960s – in particular the growth of nationalism and the 
prominence of entertainment in the media – reached one of their peaks. The framing of 
culture in this period was marked by both of these trends, and was, quite unsurprisingly, 
characterized by a far greater diversity of views on the social functions, form and content of 
culture. While some of the ideas promoted in the 1947 remained present, they now coexisted 
alongside other, sometimes radically different views. The most prominent new elements of 
the framing of culture included the following: (a) culture as an instrument of national 
integration and preservation; (b) a greater emphasis on the quality of artistic form rather than 
content; and (c) attempts to find a ‘third way’ between education and entertainment, 
commercialization and elitism.  
 
a. Culture as an instrument of national integration and preservation. Although culture was 
still considered to have an important social and political role, this role was no longer linked 
primarily to the needs of the working classes, but above all to the interests of the individual 
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Yugoslav nations. Culture was seen as an organic entity tied to the national body, destined to 
serve as an instrument of both national integration and national preservation. Reviews of 
cultural events were frequently suffused with organicist metaphors known from nineteenth-
century national romanticism. An article published in the Croatian language daily Novi list 
thus described Croatian poetry as ‘an organic, indivisible whole’, which encompasses 
‘everything that was ever written in Croatian language from the first known beginnings of 
poetry to today’.99 Another article insisted that local radio stations should broadcast 
traditional music from various Croatian regions, and argued that this will lead ‘to an even 
tighter integration into a unified entity’.100 Reports and commentaries found in Slovenian-
language newspapers were no different in this respect. One report, written by a commentator 
specializing in music, referred to a well-known Slovenian coir as ‘the voice of the nation and 
its pride’, and described its singing as ‘growing from the nation and for the nation’.101 
Another article, written by a prominent Slovenian art historian, argued that art is ‘the deepest 
companion of the life of every nation, and therefore carries in it the image of this nation’.102  
 
In contrast to the early post-war years, when nationalist framings of culture remained 
intertwined with ideas of pan-Yugoslav patriotism and notions of international class struggle, 
compatibility with these ideas were now of marginal importance; what mattered more was the 
contribution art and culture could make to national survival and integration. The emphasis on 
national survival and integration, along with the ubiquitous presence of organic metaphors 
exemplified also in the afore-examined excerpts – ‘growth’, ‘organic, indivisible whole’ – 
also signaled a subtle semantic shift in the notion of culture itself, and in the associated 
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understanding of its social and political role, which now centered on preservation rather than 
change.  
 
The exception to this rule was the framing of culture in the Italian minority newspaper. La 
Voce was not only devoid of openly nationalist descriptions of Italian culture, but even 
included articles that were unequivocally critical of the rise of nationalist sentiments. Such 
was the case with an article written by Andrea Benussi, then president of the Union of 
Italians and known for his unequivocal support of the Yugoslav socialist cause,103 who 
condemned nationalist tendencies and explicitly called for a ‘purification’ of party ranks to 
restore unity.104 When defending the cultural rights of the minority, La Voce was careful to 
frame its demands in accordance with the discourse of Yugoslav ‘brotherhood and unity’ and 
the rhetoric of revolutionary internationalism in much the same way as all of the newspapers 
in the region did in 1947. For instance, one characteristic article warned that the rise of 
Croatian nationalism in the region was running the risk of wasting ‘the rich patrimony of the 
class struggle among the proletarians of Istria’.105  
 
Such attitudes of La Voce can in part be explained as a defensive reaction to the rise of 
Slovenian and especially Croatian nationalism in the region. However, they also bear the 
imprint of a well-established post-1945 identity narrative that emphasized the contribution of 
Italians to the partisan struggle and their commitment to multiethnic coexistence. This 
narrative was coined in response to the post-war perception of the Italian minority as a 
potentially threatening ‘fifth column’, and served to promote an image of Italians as loyal 
citizens of socialist Yugoslavia.106 While public expressions of Slovenian and Croatian 
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nationalism were on the rise, La Voce chose to rely on its tested and proven legitimating 
narrative, and continued to emphasize its loyalty to socialism. Much as in 1947, discourses 
about culture served to delineate between the South Slavs and the Italian minority in the 
region, yet the logic was now strangely reversed: the Italian minority, considered a potential 
traitor in 1947, emerged as the stronghold of socialist Yugoslav values.  
 
In summary, the notion of culture as a means of national preservation still served somewhat 
similar discursive ends as the understanding of culture as a tool of progress did in 1947 – 
namely, it was used to define ‘our’ culture from within, and distinguish between what was 
good and bad. Yet in contrast to 1947, ‘our’ culture was now most often limited to individual 
national cultures – Slovenian, Croatian, Italian – rather than being explicitly equated with 
Yugoslav culture at large, let alone working class culture. Furthermore, the idea of culture as 
a means of national preservation was rarely used to explicitly position ‘our’ culture in 
geopolitical and historical terms. References to the Fascist past and the partisan struggle, and 
even to the post-war ‘Stalinist’ period, were few and far apart. Instead of emphasizing the 
revolutionary break and progress, reporting about culture was now more concerned with 
cultural preservation. Arguably, such discursive framing of culture had the exact opposite 
effect of the 1947 framing: if the 1947 emphasis on the revolutionary break and progress had 
the effect of obscuring historical continuities, the 1971 emphasis on preservation masked 
important changes, in particular the growth of nationalist sentiments and the decline of 
Yugoslav unity. To put it differently, journalistic discourse was constitutive of the rise of 
nationalist antagonisms, yet presented national differences as something that was already an 
attribute of reality, thereby obscuring its own role in shaping this same reality. 
 
 36
b. Form over substance? Another feature of the framing of culture apparent in 1971 was the 
emphasis on artistic skills and the technical execution of cultural events. Although articles 
critical of ‘modern’ and abstract art, as well as those calling for more socially engaged art, 
continued to appear, a substantial proportion of cultural reviews now paid attention to issues 
such as the quality of vocal delivery or the pictorial qualities of a work of art, without 
necessarily linking these to questions of ideological substance or mobilizational potential. For 
instance, a review of a local art exhibition, written by the Trieste-born avant-garde artist 
Milko Bambič,107 focused on the choice of techniques and on the emotional and aesthetic 
effects the paintings had on the audience. 108 Even in articles discussing the institutional 
organization of cultural activities and the various reforms needed in the sector, attention was 
paid primarily to questions of efficiency and allocation of resources, without mentioning any 
specific ideological issues.109 Also notable was the increase in the proportion of articles 
limited primarily to reporting rather than critique and evaluation.  
 
Occasionally, even the whole idea of culture as an inherently political activity – an idea that 
permeated much of the reporting in the late 1940s – was being put under question. This 
argument was particularly prominent in a lengthy commentary written by the Croatian writer 
and literary critic Igor Mandić, published in response to the blacklisting of a popular Croatian 
singer Vice Vukov on Radio Sarajevo, presumably because the audience found his songs to 
be too nationalistic. Mandić, who was known for his provocative writings, argued that 
popular singers should not be judged on the grounds of their political views. Rather, the 
audience should focus exclusively on their qualities as performers: ‘singers of popular music 
should be kept where they belong, that is, behind a microphone and in front of an orchestra, 
                                                 
107 Marko Vuk and Valentina Verani, Milko Bambič, 1905-1991: Življenje in delo (Nova Gorica: Goriški muzej, 
1992). 
108 Milko Bambič, ‘Demetrij Cej razstavlja v tržaški knjigarni’, Primorski dnevnik, 18 September 1971, p. 4. 
109 E.g. Z. L., ‘Še vedno razprave o kulturi’, Primorske novice, 05 March 1971, pp. 1 and 12; N. G., ‘Po katerih 
tirih bo šla kultura’, Primorske novice, 10 December 1971, p. 4. 
 37
and not on a political stage’. 110 In a curious twist of argument, the idea of popular culture as 
apolitical was used to defend a singer whose work had unambiguous political repercussions. 
 
The normative expectations about form and content outlined here rarely served to explicitly 
position ‘our’ culture in geopolitical and historical terms, and were instead, just as the notion 
of culture as a means of national preservation, used primarily to delineate the internal 
hierarchies of ‘our’ culture. It is also important to note that the multitude of normative views 
about the relative importance of form and content in judging culture was evidently 
underpinned by fundamental disagreements, which constitute yet another aspect that makes 
the 1971 journalistic discourse about culture very different from the discourse in 1947. Later 
in the same year, this ambiguity was at least temporary reduced by means of political purges. 
Among other things, Vice Vukov was branded a Croatian nationalist and remained abroad for 
several years due to fear of persecution, while Mandić was barred from publishing for a 
whole decade. These developments suggest that the attempt to divorce culture from politics 
had its limits – it was acceptable as long as the culture in question was not in any direct way 
challenging the legitimacy of Yugoslav ‘brotherhood and unity’. 
 
c. Between entertainment and education, between ‘trash culture’ and elitism. The disdain for 
popular culture and the emphasis on culture as a means of ideological elevation were far less 
prominent in 1971 than they were in 1947. Instead, reporters were now accepting the 
existence of differences between elite and popular cultural tastes as a given and relatively 
rarely linked culture specifically to workers. The range of cultural forms discussed and 
incorporated into newspapers itself attests to this change of attitudes. Serialized novels 
written in the tradition of socialist realism were now nowhere to be found, and were most 
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often replaced by detective stories and sentimental novels.111 The festival of jazz organized in 
Ljubljana received lengthy coverage and was described as a cultural event with ‘a rich 
program’ and ‘an established reputation’.112 News about American, but also Italian, French 
and English films and music, often accompanied by glamorous photos of famous actors and 
singers, were appearing on a regular basis, and often received sympathetic coverage.113 
Newspapers were full of admiration for popular songs, concerts and festivals that would 
earlier be dismissed as worthless and excessively idealistic, including foreign spectacles such 
as the Sanremo Music Festival.114 The domestic popular music industry had taken root as 
well, and reports attested to the great popularity of Yugoslav groups and singers, including 
for instance the Croatian singer Ivo Robič, both at home and abroad.115 To be sure, in 1971, 
none of this can be considered new. The proliferation of popular entertainment was a notable 
trend already in the 1950s and provoked concern among the members of the LCY and the 
SAWP ever since. Yet as explained earlier, this trend became far more pronounced in the 
1960s and the early 1970s.   
 
 
Not everyone, of course, was equally enthusiastic about the proliferation of entertainment 
culture in Yugoslavia. The tabloid-style coverage of (mostly Western) popular culture was 
itself conveying a rather mixed message: articles about celebrities were frequently 
interspersed with stories about unhappy private lives, hints to links with criminal or immoral 
activity, or simply plain weirdness. Most importantly, the Western pop icons were all 
presented as unmistakably foreign: as attention-grabbing and entertaining pieces in the 
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mosaic of the ‘colorful world’116 that was not really our own. As a true object of desire, 
Western popular culture remained simultaneously fascinating and threatening, and therefore 
best kept at an arms length: as something to marvel at and enjoy, but never accept as one’s 
own. Also worth noting is that the symbolic map of the world charted by the newspaper 
coverage of popular culture in north-western Yugoslavia was oriented almost exclusively to 
the West, while the rest of the world virtually disappeared from sight. Although imperfect 
and in some ways threatening, the West represented the main object of interest. 
 
The more high-brow segments of press coverage of culture were sending a more 
unambiguous message about the perils associated with Western popular imports, and popular 
culture in general. The dangers of ‘commercialization’ and ‘consumerism’ were periodically 
debated among members of the LCY and the various SAWP organs in Croatia at the time,117 
and were also among the key issues discussed at a conference of the Association of Cultural-
Educational Organizations of Slovenia organized in 1971.118 ‘Trash culture’ (šund) – a 
derogative term that encompassed everything from detective and sentimental novels to 
popular music and comics – was particularly often singled out as the target. In an article 
announcing an imminent concert by a major Slovenian coir, the commentator described the 
choir’s singing as ‘growing from and for the nation’, praised it for expressing an awareness of 
‘one’s self [and] of human ties’, and contrasted it with the ‘consumerist nonsense’ of šund.119 
As this comment indicates, negative attitudes towards popular culture were not necessarily 
based on the idea that such culture was ideologically hostile to the socialist system, but rather 
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on the conviction that it was somehow devoid of meaning, and thus of too low quality.120 This 
was in tune with views held by some of the leading LCY members; as Josip Broz Tito 
explained in one of his speeches delivered in the early 1960s, šund was not to be considered 
as an expression of Western culture, but as something the West itself considers negative.121  
 
While voicing criticisms of popular culture, many commentators were nevertheless eager to 
demarcate their criticisms from what they saw as unacceptable elitism. Some of the 
representatives of Slovenian cultural organizations discussing the threats of consumerism 
were at the same time warning of the danger of ‘deviating into an elitist understanding of 
culture’. In a socialist society, they claimed, there is simply no place for elite culture.122 In 
other words, popular culture was seen simultaneously as a threat and a blessing: a threat to 
established cultural canons, yet at the same time also a welcome shield against the dangers of 
elitism. As an article about fashion explained, the rise of mass produced, cheap clothing had 
the capacity to make designer items more easily available to an average consumer, yet on the 
other hand, it could lead to uniformity and stimulate the consumption of items one does not 
really need. Instead of siding either with designer fashion or with mass produced clothing, the 
article leaves the choice to the consumer, who should be perfectly able to avoid both 
extremes and find an individual path between the two.123 Similar ‘balancing acts’ could be 
found in articles about other forms of culture. As the director of a regional chain of cinemas 
explained in an interview, the key to the rising number of cinema-goers lied in finding a 
middle way between the demands of the ‘intellectuals’ and the cultural preferences of the 
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majority ‘to which film represents entertainment, relaxation’.124 The interviewee also 
emphasized the cinema’s attempt to educate the less demanding cinema-goers by 
occasionally introducing ‘more challenging films’, with the aim of ‘consciously educating 
those viewers who do not want to think too much while watching [the film]’. By doing so, the 
chain of cinemas was in his view able to respond both to the demands of the market and to 
the demands of film art.  
 
A factor that worked against the wholesale rejection of mass produced artifacts, consumer 
culture and Western formats was the fact that Yugoslav leaders have learned to exploit the 
popularity of these cultural forms to their own advantage, and used them to boost their 
standing abroad as well as to attract popular support at home. The media treatment of Tito’s 
encounters with Hollywood actors and films is particularly telling in this respect. When 
visiting the United States in 1971, the Yugoslav leader attended a formal welcome organized 
by the Los Angeles mayor, whose guest list included several Hollywood stars. Novi list found 
this event important enough to mention it on its cover page, and introduced it with a telling 
title: ‘Hollywood stars express admiration for Tito’. The main emphasis of the report was on 
actors’ responses to Tito’s presence; the reporter mentioned that ‘several famous celebrities 
were glad Tito visited the U.S.A,’ and ‘did not hide their admiration for Tito’s personality’.125 
1971 was also the year when Richard Burton agreed to play the role of Tito in a 
dramatization of the Battle of Sutjeska, one of the key World War Two confrontations 
between the Axis powers and the Yugoslav partisans. While the film was being shot, the 
actor and his wife Liz Taylor were constantly followed by the Yugoslav paparazzi, who were 
particularly keen on obtaining any evidence of Burton’s admiration for Tito and Yugoslavia. 
One characteristic report of this kind included Burton’s comments about Yugoslavia’s 
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‘fantastic landscape’ and Tito’s heroism, and mentioned Liz Taylor’s alleged interest in 
acting in a film about Yugoslavia.126 Evidently, the Hollywood stars were not the only objects 
of fascination in this context; rather, they served to boost popular support for Tito and 
Yugoslavia. If even Hollywood actors admired Tito, why should anyone in Yugoslavia have 
doubts about his leadership?  
 
An additional aspect that contributed to the acceptance of popular culture in the Yugoslav 
northwest was the booming tourism industry. In the 1960s alone, the number of foreign 
visitors to Yugoslavia increased from one to almost five millions per year.127 Revenues from 
tourism along the Adriatic coast were mushrooming, and the local population was keen to 
invest in further improvements of tourist facilities, including the organization of a wider 
range of cultural events targeted at foreign visitors. The local press provides ample evidence 
of how important popular culture was in boosting the leisure industry. During the summer 
months, one of the key criteria used for assessing the quality of cultural events was their 
attractiveness to Western tourists, and reporters often commended the organizers for staging a 
particularly well attended concert, or criticized them for failing to offer an attractive enough 
choice of cultural events during the tourist season.128 This can be seen as a local version of a 
more widespread tendency to use popular culture as a means of promoting Yugoslavia 
internationally, and presenting it as an exceptionally ‘liberal’ and ‘progressive’ socialist 
country.129 
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On the whole, the discourses about culture in 1971 were marked by a diversity of normative 
principles, and some of them – most notably the emphasis on culture as a means of national 
preservation, and the perception of art as apolitical – crossed the line of what was deemed 
acceptable by the LCY. In contrast to 1947, the discursive uses of these normative ideals 
were to a large extent aimed at establishing hierarchical distinctions within ‘our culture’ 
rather than at positioning ‘our’ culture in historical and geopolitical terms. The only 
exception to this rule was the coverage of popular culture, yet even here, the geopolitical 
sense of the Yugoslav self did not emerge through explicit positioning of Yugoslav culture 
with respect to ‘the East’ and ‘the West’, but was created more indirectly and implicitly, for 
instance by constructing Western entertainment as attractive yet somehow alien and 
threatening, by reporting on Western expressions of admiration for Yugoslavia, by 
emphasizing the importance of ‘impressing’ foreign visitors, and by saying virtually nothing 
about cultural developments elsewhere in the world. Such vague and indirect deictic 
positioning of the ‘here’ and ‘there, ‘us’ and ‘them’ had its counterpart in the tendency to 
associate ‘our’ culture primarily to individual national cultures rather than the Yugoslav 
culture at large.  
 
To put it differently, if the coverage in 1947 was clearly marked by the Cold War 
confrontation, and oriented towards marking the distinctiveness of Yugoslav culture vis-à-vis 
its geopolitical and historical others, the coverage in 1971 was oriented primarily to internal 
struggles and hierarchies. At the same time, the way in which these internal struggles were 
framed and categorized – exemplified in the use of organicist metaphors and the emphasis on 
national preservation rather than change – served to present them as natural and rooted in 
history, thereby obscuring the fact that they were a recent product of changing cultural 
practices and policies, and of the journalistic discourse itself. Unlike the progress-centered 
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discourse of 1947, which neglected continuities with the past, the discourse of 1971 had the 
exact opposite effect, namely of obscuring change by presenting it as part of nature and 
history. It is precisely in this discursive context that the Cold War binaries of East and West 
would re-enter the language of the Yugoslav mass media in the late 1980s and the early 
1990s, when they would be used to discursively unravel Yugoslav culture from within by 
distinguishing between the culturally ‘Western’ republics of Slovenia and Croatia, and the 
culturally ‘Eastern’ or ‘Balkan’ rest of the country.130 At that point, the whole of the Yugoslav 
past emerged as a harmful deviation from the prescribed course of modernization, and as an 
unnatural, forced marriage of the East and the West. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The conclusions drawn in this paper have important implications for our understanding of the 
Cold War, especially for any research that aims to unpack the role of discourse, language, 
ideology and culture in this historical period. First, our analysis suggest that the categories 
and distinctions used in narrating the cultural history of the Cold War – East and West, class 
and nation, socialism and capitalism, elite and mass culture etc. – should be approached with 
caution. Any application of these categories that does not take into account their shifting 
meanings and practical uses, runs the risk of missing the gap that separated subjective 
representations from political, economic and social structures they were embedded in and 
helped sustain. As shown in the paper, the particular discursive uses of Cold War categories 
and distinctions obscured their own role in creating – rather than merely describing – the 
realities of Yugoslav culture, and should therefore be subjected to critical scrutiny rather than 
taken at face value. Such critical investigation of discourse is particularly important when 
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dealing with categories and normative distinctions that continue to circulate in journalistic 
and scholarly discourse today, and have in the meantime accrued new meanings and became 
embedded in different social structures. If used unreflexively, such categories and distinctions 
can easily lead us to confuse the hopes and regrets of today with the realities and concerns of 
the past. 
 
At the same time, we should also resist the temptation of dismissing Cold War discourse as a 
mere myth that has nothing to do with the everyday realities and concerns at the time, and is 
hence unworthy of analysis. This would not only miss the constitutive role of discourse in 
shaping and sustaining Cold War realities, but also invite a rather misleading description of 
the period, organized around contrasts between myth and reality, official ideology and private 
narratives, oppression and resistance. Such a description would do little to explain why 
individual social actors were willing to overlook the mismatch between Cold War discourse 
and the realities they lived in, and even appropriate elements of this discourse as fully 
adequate descriptions of their lifeworlds. In addition, a simplistic contrast between myth and 
reality also runs the risk of ascribing too much weight to discourses that diverged from 
officially endorsed narratives and categories, and even treat them as somehow more ‘real’ 
than official ones. Such an understanding can come uncomfortably close to currently popular 
accounts of the Cold War, and risks becoming entangled in contemporary political struggles 
and divided memories of the period. 
